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Abstract 
This paper uses a scenario-based role-play experiment based on the usage of QR codes to 
detect how mobile users respond to social engineering attacks conducted via mobile devices. 
The results of this experiment outline a guided mobile phone forensics investigation method 
which could facilitate the work of digital forensics investigators while analysing the data 
from mobile devices. The behavioural response of users could be impacted by several 
aspects, such as impulsivity, smartphone usage and security or simply awareness that QR 
codes could contain malware. The findings indicate that the impulsivity of users is one of the 
key areas that determine the common mistakes of mobile device users. As a result, an 
investigative framework for mobile phone forensics is proposed based on the impulsivity and 
common mistakes of mobile device users. As a result, an investigative framework for mobile 
phone forensics is proposed based on the impulsivity and common mistakes of mobile device 
users. It could help the forensics investigators by potentially shortening the time spent on 
investigation of possible breach scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
The issues with mobile device security have been under the radar of scholars and security 
researchers for a while now. As convenient as mobile devices have become, their versatile 
interaction with the environment and their users have vulnerabilities that have received 
attention from multiple researches [1]–[7]. For a long time social engineering and flaws with 
user behaviour online was associated with computers [8]. However, as technology evolves, 
users now face another challenge, as the mobile devices have evolved to become a powerful 
tool that is connected to the internet and also cheap enough to be available to a large 
population of users that may be unable to afford a laptop and broadband service. It is thought 
that ‘10% of Americans own a smartphone but do not have broadband at home, and 15% own 
a smartphone but say that they have a limited number of options for going online other than 
their cell phone, where ‘smartphone dependent’ are likely to be people with low income, 
young adults or less educated ones [9]. Furthermore, Kaspersky Lab reported an intensive 
growth in mobile malware since 2011 and in 2013 there was more than 148,327 items of 
mobile malware [3], [10]. Therefore, it is very likely that users will regularly face threats 
related to mobile devices, yet they are likely to be unable to recognise them because of poor 
security awareness. Under such circumstances, it is not likely that users will manage the 
security of their mobile device very well. Another factor that contributes to poor hygiene 
when it comes to mobile security, is that users do not seem to significantly value their privacy 
prior to its loss.  The proliferation of mobile malware has also increased the attack surface 
and complexity in this paradigm causing traditional defence mechanisms to adapt slower than 
the overall attack evolvement. Also, network convergence allowed criminals from different 
areas and backgrounds to gather into the same space with a variety of attack techniques and 
motives. This allowed for more de-centralised, multi-staged cyber-attacks that demand a 
different approach in terms of prediction, detection and response. 
Moreover, digital forensics investigators often face challenges investigating a variety of 
mobile devices that differ from one another and they also have to make sure that the key 
principles of collecting evidence is adhered to [11]. As a result, researchers come up with a 
variety of methods and tools that help to solve existing issues, such as suggesting possible 
investigative frameworks for analysis of devices [6], [12]–[14],  applications [2], [15], [16] as 
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well as malware [3], [11], [17]–[19]. However, understanding the factors that influence the 
behaviour of mobile device users and the common mistakes behind the compromise of their 
mobile devices can be helpful for the forensics investigators and could potentially shorten the 
time spent on investigation of possible breach scenarios as forensic and allows forensics 
analysts to conduct risk-aware investigation. This is especially worthwhile since the digital 
forensics related to mobile devices is of a growing importance to researchers and scientists 
[20].  
This paper aims to address this issue by conducting a scenario-based role-play experiment 
that investigates how mobile users respond to social engineering via mobile device and to use 
the result of this experiment for a guided mobile phone forensics investigation method which 
could facilitate the work of digital forensics investigators while analysing the data from 
mobile devices. This experiment also helps to identify the trends and emerging challenges 
that have an impact on mobile device users and gives suggestions for ways of tackling this 
problem. 
For the purposes of this experiment QR Code images were used to mimic social engineering 
and phishing fraud as QR codes are potentially perfect tool for such attacks and their 
malicious use has been already observed in the past [21], [22]. Essentially, QR code could be 
as dangerous as clicking on a link or downloading an attachment in a phishing email, as the 
scanned code re-directs the user to a fake website, which could also be contaminated with 
malware.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The first section presents the overview of 
literature and summarises the previous research that has been conducted and explains how 
this research positions itself to address some of the gaps in the literature. This is followed by 
an explanation of the research method and details about the survey questionnaire in the 
second section. Finally, the last section presents and discusses the results and suggests the 
investigative framework for digital forensics. Limitations of this research as well as 
conclusions to what has been presented are outlined in sections six and seven respectively. 
2. Review of Related Work 
Users trust their mobile devices by using them for a wide variety of purposes with the help of 
the available applications – from communicating with family and friends to shopping and 
maintaining their finances online [23], [24]. This makes mobile devices a very good yet 
poorly protected source of valuable information [25]. Naturally, the more users trust their 
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mobile devices, the more attractive these devices become to attackers with malicious intents 
[19], [21], [26]. Just like malware for the traditional computers, the malware of mobile 
devices can be developed to perform a variety of tasks [18], such as collecting valuable 
information, monitoring user activity or performing tasks on behalf of the user with the help 
of spyware, worms, rootkits, bots and Trojans [17], [18], [21]. This shifting landscape of the 
cyberspace is clearly manifested by the number of new users or “electronic citizens” joining 
the Internet on a daily basis. End users are now being actively targeted using the emergence 
of new mobile devices and applications as a core attack vector. Technical solutions have 
proven only partially effective with evolving threats rendering static security controls 
ineffective as more users use their own IT devices. 
In spite of efforts on protecting users against social engineering and phishing emails in 
traditional computing platforms [8], [27], there is very little attention paid for security 
awareness of mobile device users. Many users jailbreak their devices with no apparent reason  
of why this should not be done, as it looks like a third party provides a legitimate software, 
only outside the app store and it may look like there is nothing wrong with that [28], [29]. In 
fact, users may even think that the app stores actually put unnecessary constrains on 
downloading and using the applications, while somewhere else they exist for free and with 
added functionalities [29]. Users, however, are unaware that malware is what usually comes 
as an added feature too with significant privacy and financial losses [17], [28], [30]. Users 
may feel that access lock on the device is an inconvenience rather than protection [31] as the 
common understanding about security is that there is nothing to hide [32], yet it shows that 
users are unaware of what happens when the device is lost or stolen without having any 
access protection on it. Due to software development malpractices software developers also 
create applications that request too many access permissions to the information on the mobile 
device which could lead to exploitation of the device [4], [18]. However, users hardly ever 
pay attention to what access is required by the applications as access provisioning is like 
terms and conditions of software usage that nobody cares to read  [29]. Moreover, due to 
limited screen size of mobile devices, it may be difficult to see all the content that pops up as 
potential fraud, only a part of a web address may be visible which eventually make it difficult 
to differentiate between legitimate and malicious contents [8], [29].  
QR codes are originally created for a legitimate reason and has a useful purpose, however 
attackers have realised that QR codes could serve as a perfect social engineering tool which 
can be used for redirection to fake websites and installation of malware onto user’s mobile 
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devices [21], [22]. While QR codes are fairly new feature in the world of technology and 
their popularity is growing steadily [21], [33], they are bringing up a new route for malware 
to spread. QR codes are often associated with promotions, discounts or coupons that users 
expect to receive when they interact with the QR code and the destination website [33]. This 
is an ideal way to spread fraud as users actually expect to receive something by scanning a 
QR code, therefore the request to install a malicious application could be perceived as part of 
a reward process [22], [33]. As a consequence, mobile device users could be particularly 
susceptible to frauds utilising QR codes.  
On the other side there is a lack of unified approach for the investigation of mobile devices 
and hardly any consideration of user behaviour that led to the compromise of a mobile device 
[6]. Many researchers focused on collecting evidences of forensics value from mobile phone 
based on potential location of evidences. Other forensics investigators, especially those 
investigating iOS platform suggested to collect and preserve data from cloud platforms 
connected to the mobile device [2], [14], [16], [34]–[36]. However, there is yet any approach 
to conduct investigation of mobile devices based on common security risks that mobile 
device users are facing because of their own mistakes.    
This paper analyses the role that the users' behavioural factors play in the overall users’ 
perception of mobile device security and then propose a guideline for conducting forensics 
investigation of mobile devices on the basis of common security mistakes of mobile users. 
3. Experiment Design 
An online web-based questionnaire was created to assess the user interaction with QR codes. 
It was accessible through an online invitation from the researcher. The questionnaire was 
divided into three parts. The first part was assessment of 10 QR code images, which were 
carefully created by the research team. Half of these images contained a genuine URL and the 
other half was bogus URLs. The 10 QR codes were carefully selected to represent a range of 
topics that are associated with common day to day activities, such as shopping, 
advertisement, product labelling and sites for information. The second part of the 
questionnaire contained demographic information about the participants in order to evaluate 
their familiarity with smartphone security. It consisted of age, gender, current employment 
status and level of education. The third part of the questionnaire was used for cognitive 
reflection test (CRT) to measure the cognitive impulsivity of the test participants. The reason 
for arranging these parts in such way is to ensure that the demographic questions would not 
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alert the participants that they were involved in a mobile security study until after they had 
completed their assessment of the 10 QR codes. 
A total of 100 participants consisting of university students, lecturers and staff participated in 
the experiment. The participants were divided into two groups to complete questionnaire in 
two different sessions. Each session took around 30 minutes and were facilitated by a 
member of the research team who explained the purpose of the study to participants. In the 
first session participants were informed that they were participating in a study that aims to 
understand the user behaviour with regards to QR code without explaining about its possible 
malicious use. In the second session participants were informed that the study investigates 
potentials for exploiting some aspects of user’s security using QR codes and what is the 
definition of an ‘exploit’. The users were asked to act on behalf of a made up character and 
their task was to determine if the QR code was genuine or not and, if they could, provide the 
reasons why the code was fake in their opinion. The reason of this approach was to measure 
the factor of users’ expectancy and how does that affect the results, if at all. 
The research aimed to analyse the following variables: 
1) Familiarity with the security of smartphones. The participants were not directly 
asked to rate their familiarity with mobile devices, as their judgement would only 
show their own opinion. The variable was created using the Predictive Analytics 
Software (PASW) syntax coding to predict the average score of the demographic 
questionnaire. 
2) Cognitive impulsivity. To measure that participants completed the CRT which 
consisted of three questions. Due to the nature of CRT, the participants had to think 
before providing an answer as the most obvious response was not the correct one. 
Participants received 1 score for a correct answer while the higher was the score, the 
better was the person in controlling the impulsivity. This test was chosen as it is likely 
that the predictive validity of this measure is equal or above other cognitive tests that 
claim to measure cognitive impulsivity. This measure was included into this study to 
investigate if impulsivity could lead to wrong identification of fake or genuine QR 
code. 
3) Behavioural response. Participants were given the question with answers below. The 
way they responded was used to measure their behavioural response. 
How would you deal with this QR code? 
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a) Scan the QR code and click on the URL 
b) Scan the QR code and verify the URL 
c) Scan the QR code and leave it 
d) Never scan the QR code 
Two behavioural answer variables of each participant were calculated using the previously 
used PASW software, both for a genuine QR code behaviour score and a genuine QR, as 
follows. 
If the QR code being evaluated as genuine: 
 The participant would score 10 for response; 
 1 5 for response; 
 1 2.5 for response; and 
 1 0 for response. 
If the QR code being evaluated as fake: 
 The participant would score 0 for responses; 
 1 2.5 for response; 
 1 5 for response; and 
 1 10 for response. 
Participants could score a maximum of 100 and a minimum of 0 for each type of QR code.  
4. Results and discussion 
Table 2 sums up the average scores for both categories of managing fake QR code and the 
genuine one. The results show that those participants that knew about the purpose of the 
questionnaire and the study scored higher than those who did not know what the 
questionnaire was for. Based on these findings, there was a small difference between the two 
groups of participants. Overall, genuine QR code was managed better than the fake one. 
Description  Mean Score of Questionnaire Findings 
Total Point Accumulated for 100 Participants 4611 
Total Score for 100 Participants  329.326 
Mean Score for 1 Participant 3.29 
Table 2: Result of Questionnaires 
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4.1  Familiarity with smartphones security 
According to the findings of the questionnaire, the more familiar users were with smartphone 
security, the better they dealt with the QR code assessments. This finding was statistically 
significant and somewhat predictable as people who are familiar with smartphone security are 
likely to be more aware of the risks and consequences associated with fake QR code rather 
than people who do not use such devices very often. 
 Not Informed Informed Total 
Fake QR Code 22.1 29.2 25.65 
Genuine QR code 30.65 31.1 30.875 
Table 3: Average behavioural score for managing QR codes 
Table 2 shows that the total score of the online questionnaire survey is 3.29 out of 5. It is fair 
to conclude that the majority of the participants were familiar with smartphone security. This 
had no significant impact for dealing with the genuine QR codes but as it is shown in Table 3 
it impacted the way the participants treated the fake QR codes. 
   
Figure 1: The comparison of CRT scores between the participants that were informed and not informed 
about the survey and the impact of CRT on how the participants managed the codes. 
1.1 Cognitive impulsivity 
Less impulsive people who did not know what the purpose of this test was (those with a 
higher CRT score) responded better, as shown in the diagrams below (Figure 1). Participants 
with higher CRT scores were less likely to click on the URL held inside the fake QR code. 
The cognitive impulsivity did not show any significant difference on the participants who 
were informed what the study was about. 
5. Forensics Investigation Guideline 
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The performed experiment shows how susceptible users are to downloading and installing a 
piece of software on their mobile device. Even those participants who knew that they should 
be careful about the QR codes that were presented to them still did not pay enough attention 
while making decisions in using the mobile device. This suggests that apart from user 
education in smartphone security, cognitive impulsivity is the key component in the decision 
making of users. A logical assumption suggests that the highest potential to act without a 
second thought arises when a user experiences any kind of social engineering or when they 
do not pay enough attention while performing other tasks. Depending on the method of the 
attack a user may be exposed to some social engineering attack attempts before they get 
tricked into downloading and installing a malware. It could also be that a user does not have a 
full view of the advertisement or a pop-ups that open together with a legitimate website and 
could accidentally click on it while trying to switch it off. However, a lot of the common 
mobile device user mistakes come from conscious decision making and owner’s actions. 
The suggested forensics investigation guideline that is shown in Figure 2 prioritises forensics 
investigator actions in regard to common the mistakes that arise from social engineering of 
end-users, where gradient colours indicate the level of social engineering involved and the 
next step in the flowchart. 
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 Figure 2: Suggested forensics investigation guideline based on users’ common security mistakes  
Social engineering is understood as tricking someone into ‘breaking security policies’, where 
spam is an example of social engineering [37]. Lately there are various types of spam, such as 
junk emails, Phishing, SMShing, annoying advertisements and pop-ups while browsing the 
Internet [38]. All types of this spam is relevant to mobile devices and their users when mobile 
devices allow website content. A user may accidentally click on any of them simply because 
of their design and lack of full visibility on the screen of a mobile device. Also, it is possible 
to accidentally click on a pop-up or advertisement just by trying to switch it off and get rid of 
it as well as to be tricked into thinking that it is a part of a legitimate website that a user tried 
to open. It is probably the most popular way for malware to spread and attack mobile device 
users. For this reason as well as potentially the highest likelihood of cognitive impulsivity 
impact it is suggested to consider this group of items first when conducting a digital 
investigation. 
Second comes a group of actions that contain social engineering, yet a user must make a 
conscious decision to perform an action. Those are likely to be mistakes that user perform out 
of curiosity, convenience or benefit. Logging into a compromised public Wi-Fi, a scan of a 
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QR code or a barcode could be a few examples of such behaviour that may lead to the 
exploitation of the mobile device. 
The next step is to check if a user has jailbroken the mobile device. Users jailbreak their 
mobile devices seeking a variety of benefits without realising that the third party software 
may contain malware. This action requires a conscious decision and is therefore one of the 
least impulsive actions that a user may take. Information sharing about third party software 
repositories and de-centralised threat management systems is more prominent than ever, 
which contrast to the traditional approaches in cyber/computer security principles related to 
restrictions in input data and controlling human behaviour. The paradigm is shifted towards 
monitoring and studying human aspects in users’ interaction with their mobiles as part of the 
formal actions and decision making processes within adversarial clusters, 
The last step that is to detect if a user is using legitimate applications that require excessive 
permissions on a mobile device and the mobile device gets exploited due to compromise of 
such application, for example via infected application update. Users hardly understand the 
permissions which are required by various applications and what they are given access to. 
Possibly even less of users think twice before installing such applications or at least consider 
disabling the unnecessary access requests. 
These common mistakes of mobile device users contain a certain level of impulsivity which, 
according to the role-play experiment is an important factor that leads to the highest 
likelihood of mobile device exploitation and end user security flaws. Certainly, other ways of 
exploiting mobile devices that do not require user interaction are also possible, yet they 
should be analysed using other available investigation methods. 
6. Limitations 
Similar to any other studies, this study has several limitations as well. Firstly, QR codes is 
only one threat among others in the spectrum of mobile device exploit possibilities and there 
could be other equally valid threats associated with mobile devices. However, the phishing-
type of social engineering that users are used to seeing as emails can be well replicated by 
QR codes on mobile devices and therefore QR codes served well for the purpose of the 
experiment. 
Secondly, the study was based on a role play experiment that required users to analyse the 
given information and provide an advice. However, participants were not required to scan QR 
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code from an unknown source, website or station and therefore results may not imply real-
world scenarios. 
Moreover, the participants of this study did not have the contextual information that would 
often influence the decision making. For example, they did not know what was the 
occupation of the fictitious character on behalf of which they were acting, neither how 
technology-savvy that person is, nor whether she liked to use the QR code technology. 
Another limitation of this research relates to the sample of participants. The total of 100 
participants in this study were all members of one university – students, lecturers and staff. A 
sample of this kind is likely to be biased in terms of age, education, familiarity with mobile 
security apps and various other factors. Therefore, the conclusions of this experiment are not 
necessarily representative of the general population of the mobile device users. 
7. Conclusion and Further Research 
The aim of this paper is to conduct a scenario-based role-play experiment that investigates 
how mobile users respond to social engineering via mobile device and to use the result of this 
experiment for a guided mobile phone forensics investigation which could facilitate the work 
of digital forensics investigators while analysing the data from mobile devices. For the 
purposes of this research the fraud was a QR code and the findings indicate that the genuine 
QR codes were managed better than the fake ones and this did not depend on how much 
informed the participants were about the experiment.  
Although informed participants performed better in managing both types of QR codes, they 
were significantly better in managing the fake ones. This implies that educated mobile device 
users are much better in managing security of their phones. The users should be continuously 
reminded that the QR codes could contain malware that may infect their devices, yet it is only 
one aspect of mobile device security. This experiment simply shows that increased user 
awareness helps to improve secure user behaviour.  
This research also analysed few other factors that have impact on users when they face a QR 
code. The survey results indicate that controlled impulsiveness is associated with improved 
performance in managing fake QR codes in users who were not informed about the purpose 
of this study. However, these factors did not have a significant impact when users were 
informed about the purpose of the study, but on the other hand their familiarity with mobile 
device security helped them to recognise the fake QR codes. This shows that when users are 
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well informed and become aware of social engineering they may be more impulsive in their 
decision making towards mobile device security.  
As a result, a forensic investigation guideline was suggested in accordance with common 
security mistakes of mobile device users. The guideline suggested to focus on possible 
remnants of user activities resulted of a user impulsivity, lack of knowledge and 
understanding during forensics investigation. This research only briefly touched the aspect of 
application permissions and malware on mobile devices, therefore the future research could 
further investigate users' perception of application permissions on their device and the limits 
of intrusion that users allow for the applications and suggest an investigation guideline based 
on users’ awareness and their ability to recognise malware on their mobile devices. 
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